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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA: IS THE
CRITICISM MISDIRECTED?*
By
FREDERIC

K.

SPIES**

I Introduction
Perhaps no body of legal rules in recent years has been subjected to more
criticism, both learned and emotional, as the law of divorce and its corollary in respect to family instability, the law of marriage. There has been a torrent of literature concerning the increase of migratory divorces, and many writers have
pointed to our rising divorce rate' as symptomatic of the moral laxity of the
times.
There is little agreement among authorities about the underlying causes
of divorce, although plenty of dark references have been made to the variance
which is said to exist between the grounds alleged in most legal actions for divorce and the so-called basic factors which actually lead a spouse to seek dissolution of the marriage.2 It may be true that a disenchanted mate rarely sets
forth his real complaint when he sues for divorce, but even this common plaint
is not firmly supported by empirical data. Certainly, many written and vocal
expressions of concern seem to be based on unproved assumptions. In this connection, Professor Max Rheinstein some years ago wisely pointed out that the
law of domestic relations never has attracted the professional talent given over
to the public law areas, even though almost everyone is influenced by family
law. Moreover, ".

.

. [f]or that very reason the people interested in it have

remained unorganized and thus unable to influence legislation. There are no
organizations and no lobbies of illegitimate children, divorced husbands or housewives." 3
Notwithstanding the lack of knowledge of basic factors in family relations and family law, two organs of government have been the subject of criticism and suggested reform. One of them is, of course, the statutory structure
which in all jurisdictions is the basis of divorce itself. The statutes are thought
to be inherently defective as a form of social control because by prescribing certain conduct of one spouse as grounds for the other's cause of action, they tend
* Based on a paper presented to the Seminar in Law and Sociology, New York University Law
School, Summer Program for Law Teachers, 1955.
** Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law.
1 The United States had the highest divorce rate of any country in the period 1910-1948, the
ratio of divorces per 1,000 marriages per year increasing from 100.2 to 248.1 in the decade between 1937 and 1947. In England, under stable legislation, the divorce rate increased from 15.2
to 138.5 per 1,000 marriages per year during the same period. Elliott, Divorce Legislation and
Family Instability, 272 ANNALS 134, 140 (1950).
2 Id. at 145.
8 Rheinstein, The Need for Research in Family Law, 16 U. CHI. L. R.v. 691 (1949).
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to promote a "unilateral" approach in the divorce situation, with a resultant
"factorizing" of each problem into separate and artificial categories. 4 It is said
that this obscures the many factors which account for divorce and thereby increases the problems of analyzing its cause, as well as making it impossible for
legislators to draft statutes which do comply with social needs.
The content of the statutes themselves has been criticized also on the interesting sociological basis that what is sauce for the goose is not necessarily
sauce for the gander: 5
"Modern divorce legislation' reflects (as does all social legislation) the opinions entertained by the legislators. Divorce legislation,
it follows, incorporates the provisions which legislators believe should
be sufficient grounds for dissolving the estate of matrimony. These
legislators . . . do not represent their whole constituency. They merely

represent upper middle class attitudes which are the backbone of the
group's moral standards. Our divorce provisions in a sense thus represent in a negative way the standards of conduct required of a mate
in America."
The general feeling seems to be, however, that recent legislation has tended to enlarge or liberalize divorce by an extension of the statutory grounds,
The problems which are created by the varying substantive provisions from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction are further complicated by procedural differences,
especially in regard to residence requirements. Most of the proposals for reform center on the standardization of this procedure, and the search for a workable adjective law has all but overwhelmed the problems created by diverse
substantive grounds for divorce. 6
On the trial level, lay and professional reformers alike have agitated for
reform. In Pennsylvania, the problem is amplified by the extensive use of the
mastership system, which is the statutory device for determining fact and law
in the action, subject to court adoption." Masters are appointed on motion of
the libellant's attorney from members of the county bar (often in alphabetical order), and almost every lawyer obtains experience in the domestic relations area, even if he never acts for the libellant or respondent. It is thought
that the extreme variation in divorce practices among the jurisdictions may be
accounted for by the actual administration of divorce statutes (of which the
Pennsylvania mastership system is only one example), rather than through lack

4 LICHTENBERGER, DIVORCE: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1931),

reproduced

in

HARPER,

PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 653 (1952).
5 Elliott, op. cit supra note 1, at 134.
6 Note, Reform-The Law of Divorce, 17 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 380 (1949), discussing five
proposed solutions for the present confusion in family law administration: (1) a Federal Divorce
Act, (2) a Uniform Divorce Law, (3) a full faith and credit statute, (4) the possibility of substituting "residence" for "domicil" as a jurisdictional basis for divorce, and (5) family courts.
7 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 36 (Purdon 1955).
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of uniformity in their substantive provisions,8 although, as a matter of fact,
the substantive grounds do vary widely from state to state. 9 In addition, express statutory variations are emphasized by differing appellate interpretations.
Surely this is a valid thesis, and there have been eloquent suggestions for
improvement of divorce administration on the trial level, most of them stressing the importance of reducing the adversary nature of the proceedings. 10 One
of the most comprehensive and enlightened efforts to draw "preventive law"
into family problems is found in the Record of the Conference on Law, Medicine and the Unstable Family,"' in which the conferees sought to implement
the kind of reforms vigorously called for by Judge Paul Alexander.12 Briefly,
the predicament of the trial judge is that "Too often the problem . . • is presented to us as one of passing upon events after they have happened, and of
decreeing some legal consequence for a divorce, or an annulment, or a separation.""3 The reason for this feeling is that the machinery available to lower
courts in divorce matters simply is not adequate. The present judicial structure
on this level should be supplemented by providing the courts with psychiatrists,
social workers and other non-legal agencies to aid the court in solving family
problems. Another suggestion is that the lower courts should be replaced entirely by "family courts," operated on the same basis as many juvenile courts,
which would have the means to investigate the source of the marital problem
complained of.
The confusion, uncertainty and disapproval of family law is all too often
reflected in the approach of many lawyers to a domestic relations case. Some
attorneys refuse to deal with them at all, which is no particular credit to the
8 For an exhaustive examination of the operation and effect of the mastership system in one
Pennsylvania locality, see Note, The Administration of Divorce: A Philadelphia Study, 101 U.

PA. L. REV. 1204 (1953).

The note concludes on the thought that ".

.

. [t~he extent to which

masters comply with and enforce the statute is more significant than appellate court decisions
in terms of the actual conditions under which the vast majority of divorces are granted." Id. at
1222. As support for this contention, the article includes statistics showing that of 3,866 divorces
granted in Philadelphia in 1948, only eight were taken to the Superior Court on appeal, and none
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Does not this viewpoint misplace cause and effect? Thousands of lawyers look to a few appellate decisions in determining how to proceed in a divorce
action, and when they act as masters, the same decisions guide them in making recommendations
to the court. It is, of course, true that administration on the trial or mastership level may go
awry in interpreting the meaning of appellate cases.
9 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, § 62, at 7 (1932); LICHTENBERGER, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 650.

10 Fenberg, The Uniform Divorce Bill: A Proposed Solution for our Divorce Muddle, 41 A:
B. A. J. 247

(1955),

stressing the value of a therapeutic approach to family problems. In

lit-

igation, the complaint would be superseded by a petition entitled: "In the Matter of the Family
of John Doe." See also Note, A Domestic Relations Court for Pennsylvania, 60 DICK. L. REV.
181 (1956), which discusses some problems of establishing family courts in Pennsylvania.
11 NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE AND THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION
(1949).
12 Alexander, The Follies of Divorce: A Therapeutic Approach to the Problem, 36 A. B. A. J.

105 (1950); Alexander, Let's Get the Embattled Spouses out of the Trenches, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 98 (1953).

18 Beck, Introduction, supra note 11 at 89.
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profession, and those who do find themselves pretty much in the position described by Professor Kramer: ". . . [The lawyer's] uneasiness stems from a
realization of the superficial and even cynical, if not hypocritical, manner in which
many courts and his colleagues, perhaps only reflecting the mores of their communities, function when called upon for help in these matters."' 14
The popular notion of what happens in a divorce court was well summed
up by a law teacher who, after showing that "cruelty" as grounds for divorce
may consist of "physical cruelty," "extreme cruelty," or "cruel and barbarous
treatment," according to the whims of the jurisdiction, made the following sarcastic observation:1r
"Moreover, different judges interpret cruelty according to their
own prejudices. Some demand a real display of sadism and may remain
unimpressed by sporadic kicking, biting, or tossing of ashtrays. Others,
in actual cases, have stretched 'cruelty' to cover a husband's caustic
comments on his wife's lipstick, her golf game or her mashed potatoes. .. "
Thus, the legal institutions which handle divorces, having been the subjects of extensive review and comment during the past decade, seem to be found
wanting by the public, by the lawyers, by the practitioners of all the connected
disciplines, especially sociologists and psychologists, and by the judges and
legislators. In the face of such universal opprobrium, one wonders why positive action has not been undertaken long before now.
II Social Reality
Unanimity of opinion about something as broad as family law is often deceptive of the nature of the thing upon which the opinion is brought to bear.
It may be that it is not only the sociological bases of the divorce problem which
have not been sufficiently investigated, but that much of the criticism has been
directed at legal institutions which are not as instrumental in the family law
crisis as opinion would lead one to think.
For one thing, are our statutes fundamentally at fault? Even if they are,
how much could statutory reform per se contribute to better treatment of family problems? There seems to be a feeling among those urging reform that there
is a deplorable tendency at present to "liberalize" divorce statutes, and, as a
consequence, that a statute enlarging the grounds for divorce somehow embodies and gives legislative sanction to an immoral practice. Statistics, however, do not bear out the contention that easier divorce laws result in more
divorce,' 6 and the divorce rate actually may be independent of statutory policy.
Moreover, in some states, like Pennsylvania, the content of the divorce act has
14 Kramer, Forward, Divorce: A Re-Examination of Basic Concepts, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
1 (1953).
15 Rodell, Divorce Muddle, Life, Sept. 3, 1945, p. 87.
16 Although there is some evidence that this is the case. See Elliott, op. cit. supra note 1, at 140.

DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA:

IS THE CRITICISM MISDIRECTED

not been changed for many years, yet within that same content more and more
divorces have been granted. 17
Apparently investigating in response to a reform movement which demanded the tightening up of divorce legislation, Professor H. R. Hahlo reported that: 18
1...Experience at all times and in all countries has shown that
as long as divorce is permitted on any ground whatsoever, spouses who
have agreed to part can obtain a divorce. Furthermore, even if the divorce rate could be substantially reduced by the adoption of a rigorous
divorce law, it would not necessarily mean that the problem of disintegration of family life has been solved-it may only have been cloaked. While it is possible to place obstacles in the way of divorce, there
is nothing the law can do to stop a person from leaving his or her
spouse, and in countries where there is no divorce there are still broken
homes."
Professor Hahlo finally concluded that law reform purely to inhibit divorce is "naive," because the marriage usually is long dead before a lawyer is
consulted. If one is thus willing to assume that social control cannot be obtained by increasing or decreasing grounds for divorce, on the order of opening or dosing a faucet, might not constructive legislation at least inaugurate
reform on the administrative level by the introduction of family courts? Would
this remove the stigma of the seemingly capricious and arbitrary decisions in
the trial courts and masters' hearings?
Advocates of the family court system set forth a definite and well-intentioned program for the reform of trial court procedure. They point out that
annulment and divorce laws are administered on the county court level without any effective pre-trial devices to handle the difficult issues of support, or
custody of children, or to provide other measures which could stave off divorce.
They suggest that "A mere rule of court prescribing briefs on these issues
would be sufficient to induce pre-trial conferences in lawyers' offices and lead
to constructive solutions in many cases."' 19
Another feature of the family court plan is suspension of legal action until
the social agencies working with the court make an investigation, with the intimation that the parties, given time, may simmer down after a particularly hot
marital dispute.
Without attempting to deprecate the program, it must in honesty be said
that the writer has not uncovered even the slightest expression of doubt regarding its efficacy. The written material exudes confidence, and one is led to
17 As to the major causes of divorce--adultery, cruelty, indignities, and desertion-the present
act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (Purdon 1955) follows the old Act of March 13, 1815, P. L.
150, 6 Sm. L. 286.
18 Hahlo, Can Law Reform Stop the Disintegration of Pamily Life? 71 So. AFR. L. J. 39D

(1954).

19 Wherry, Changing Concept of Law, BAR BULLETIN, NEw YORK COUNTY LAwYEPs AsSOCATION, vol. 6, no. 4 (March, 1949), at 10.
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believe that the proponents of the family court regard it as a panacea for all
the ills of family disintegration. Unfortunately, this may not be the case.
For one thing, the family court is only one element in the legal processes
bearing on the family. There is also this consideration: does sociological evidence indicate that the public will respond to a family court program? Although the paucity of material in this area already has been mentioned, there
is the viewpoint that public acceptance might not be forthcoming.
"The present problem is of modern growth within the twentieth
century, accelerated since the first World War. [Footnotes omitted]
It has been in part sanctioned by statutes and judicial procedures. For
the most part, however, it derives from a change in public opinion.
Despite criticisms and cries of alarm, the public has never rallied to
oppose or check the liberalization of divorce . . . Also, millions of

citizens, already divorced, have naturally tended to resist any moveby implication, would put blame on their character and
ment which, 20
social status."
There are two major problems suggested in this statement by a Catholic
writer. What is the nature of the "change in public opinion" which Bishop
MacKenzie mentioned? What effect does it exert on the law of divorce?
There probably is no single satisfactory answer to the nature of changing
public opinion in regard to dissolution of the family tie, although an era of
war and uncertainty, the general increase in material wealth and the stress on
its individual attainment, and a rise in moral laxity have all been said to play
a part. Whatever its source, it is a powerful force, and in the face of it, traditional grounds for divorce have been twisted beyond recognition as the courts
vainly have tried to close the gap between legal practice and this new social
reality.
For years the sociologists have emphasized that "The legal grounds for
divorce are not the 'real' reasons," and, in the absence of their similarity, that
mutual consent has become the real basis of most divorces.2 1 Experience since
the second world war confirms that the dichotomy has grown considerably.
In this light, the attitude of many lawyers would, perhaps, seem to be less
hypocritical, and the present undersirable state of family law at the trial level
would appear to be the inevitable result of immovable law in an inexorably
changing social pattern. Statutory "reform" cannot help to solve the problem
20 MacKenzie, Spiritual Values and the Family in Court, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 21 (1953).
21 YOUNG, SOCIOLOGY, A STUDY OF SOCIETY AND -CULTURE 444 (1942). Another writer intimates that the inability of parties who do not get along to separate is an invasion of liberty:
"The old Roman idea that wishes and welfare of the people should be determinative of their
marital status, a principle founded on liberty and equality, has today taken root in only a few
of the more progressive countries. To compel an unwilling spouse to remain married was as unthinkable to the Romans as to compel an unwilling person to enter marriage. The paternalistic
exercise of coercion is not particularly conducive to deep or analytical meditation on the welfare
of individuals." DRUMMOND, GETTING A DIVORCE 23 (1931). This writer has not discovered
any serious students of law or sociology who regard this kind of freedom as a necessary or natural development in a Judeo-Christian culture.
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unless it takes cognizance of new attitudes.2 2 Family courts, or, at the very
least, court machinery better designed to deal with marital problems, have a
place in the scheme, but their effectiveness can be realized only as a part of a
whole process of legal institutions tailored to cope with the problems of family instability.
But is there not a missing element which must be taken into account in
any explanation of growing divorce in the wake of both public and professional
criticism of that very phenomenon-a factor, the effect of which has been ignored in most analyses of the present family law situation? The writer suggests
that the activity of the appellate courts, especially in the past two decades, offers better evidence of past deficiencies and present needs, both social and
legal, than either lower court practices or statutory provisions. No one would
deny that many appellate cases deal with problems of the family: how have
these decisions contributed to the unhealthy condition of divorce law administration?
III

The Role of the Appellate Courts
"Sooner or later, if the demands of social utility are sufficiently
urgent, if the operation of an existing rule is sufficiently productive
of hardship or inconvenience,
utility will tend to triumph."-Ben28
jamin N. Cardozo
Even while the agitation for reform of divorce law and procedure has
been coming into full bloom, the appellate courts have been formulating new
law. Although courts on this level are generally conceded to be sensitive to
public opinion, it is a rare court which admits that it has acted in response to
such opinion. Thus, change by way of appellate decision is often a very subtle
process, effected by a manipulation of rules of law, while the court's motivation remains unstated but is implicit in the new law which results.
It is suggested that both the Supreme Court and the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania have acted in response to an underlying feeling that divorce no
longer carries with it the censure that was prevalent in the nineteenth or early
twentieth centuries. Moreover, social realism on the appellate level is responsible, perversely enough, for the prevailing and widely criticized attitude of
many lawyers toward divorce. This is because the apparently distorted convolutions of divorce administration at the trial level are a reflection of the appellate adaption of divorce law to the pressure of evolving social norms. Progress at the appellate level, in other words, has put this phase of the legal
process out of synchronization with old procedure and substantive remedies, thereby compounding the problems of a realistic approach to family law as a whole.
Three major areas in which the Pennsylvania appellate courts have been
tending toward a relaxation of earlier, more stringent rules serve to illustrate
22 Elliott, op. cit. supra note 1, at 144.
28 SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozo

238 (Hall ed. 1947).
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the phenomenon. One of the most interesting developments is represented in
the line of cases dealing with desertion, the second most used ground for divorce. 24
In Pennsylvania, the words of the statute providing the innocent and injured spouse a divorce for desertion would seem to be transparently clear: he
may be granted a divorce when it is proved ". . . that the other spouse . . .
shall have committed wilful and malicious desertion, and absence from the habitation of the injured and innocent spouse, without a reasonable cause, for and
during the term and space of two years." 2 5 The classic case definition of the
meaning of these words appeared almost a hundred years ago in Ingersoll v.
Ingersoll,2 6 where the Supreme Court held: "Desertion is an actual abondonment of matrimonial cohabitation, with an intent to desert, wilfully and maliciously persisted in, without cause, for two years. The guilty intent is manifested when, without cause or consent, either party withdraws from the residence
27
of the other."
What has happened since the formulation of this rule? Beginning in the
nineteenth century and continuing up to the present, the so-called "Married
Women's Acts" in this state and in other jurisdictions have granted complete
freedom to contract, to act as surety, and to deal with realty (with some restrictions), until the subservient legal status of the married female which characterized Anglo-American law for centuries has been obviated entirely. The
profession usually categorizes the increasing number of legal capacities in the
hands of married women into the mentioned compartments, but the fact remains that her freedom is carried over to family matters as well. A wife who
might stay at home and endure her husband's abuses fifty or even twenty years
ago now has the economic capacity, through her own ability to earn in addition
to her right to support, to leave the marital home.
Notwithstanding increasing statutory recognition of the wife's emergence
as an individual in society, it is dear that the original language of the act and
the Ingersoll decision consider the departing spouse as the one who has committed the desertion, doubtless on the assumption that it is the wrongfully departing husband who will leave the innocent and injured wife behind. But
what was the result in the past when an ill-treated wife left the husbandcould she sue him for desertion?
Although one early Pennsylvania case permitted such a suit where the wife
had left her husband under extreme circumstances which would have unquestionably amounted to cruelty, 28 the controlling decision for years had been the
24 Clague, Statistics of Family Instability, inIra note 80.
25 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1) (d) (Purdon 1955).
26 49 Pa. 249, 251 (1865).

27 For a thorough summary of the meaning of the phrases in this collective definition which
are not discussed herein, see 1 FREEDMAN, LAW OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCE IN PENNSYL-

VANIA, C. 20 (1939).
28 Howe v. Howe, 16 Pa. Super. 193 (1901).

DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA: IS THE CRITICISM MISDIRECTED

case of Young v. Young. 29 The husband absented himself after being subjected to certain indignities by his wife, and, after two years, he sued her for
desertion. He did not prevail.
.. . It nowhere appears that it was the legislative purpose to
make cruel and barbarous treatment or indignities to the person the
equivalent of desertion. The causes are entirely distinct and the evidence sustaining one is of a wholly different nature from that necessary to establish the other. We cannot regard evidence of cruelty or
indignities practiced by the wife as sufficient to establish a desertion
of her husband by her. The law provides a specific remedy for a husband injured by the cruelty of his wife or by her conduct amounting to
and to this the injured party must appeal if
indignities to his person,
'8
he would have relief."'
This was about as unequivocal a statement of policy as a court could express, and the effect of the Young decision lasted for a long time. Consequently, Pennsylvania seemed destined never to have a "constructive desertion" doctrine, although one authority found that the scarcity of appellate decision left
contradictory lower court cases in a state of confusion. 3 1
Appellate authority finally arrived, however, in the form of Reiter v.
Reiter,S2 decided in 1946. In this case, the Superior Court had to face squarely
the question presented when the wife, who was the erring spouse, remained
at the marital home after threatening her husband that she would "bash [his]
brains in," and, upon his departure, further advised him not to return because
she intended to change the locks on the doors. When the husband returned
some days later to pick up his clothing and see the children, he found "certain doors" locked, and, at the trial, he testified that he left because he was
afraid his wife would do him "bodily harm."
The Reiter decision raises some interesting problems which are mainly legal, but the case has its sociological implications as well. While the court indicated by way of dictum that it would have affirmed the decree which had
been awarded the husband, it reversed the trial court because, under its charge,
the jury could have found "wilful and malicious" desertion without also finding that the libellant-husband had left out of justifiable fear for his life.33
As a gratuity of the highest importance, however, the Superior Court then
offered three important means by which one spouse may legally "desert" the
other:84
29 83 Pa. Super. 492 (1924).
80 Id. at 496.
81 1 FREEDMAN,

op. cit. supra note 27, at 608.

32 159 Pa. Super. 344, 48 A. 2d 66 (1946).
83 The trial court fell into this error by advising the jury that it could find for the husband
(that is, find that his wife had "deserted" him) if he had been "compelled" to leave the marital:
home. Since the compulsion could have been something less than fear of immediate bodily harm,
the instruction was too broad.
34 Id. at 348, 48 A. 2d at 69.
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Where a husband purposely locks out, or bars, his wife

from the common habitation, her habitation is no longer his home, but
is the street or place to which she goes, and the husband has deserted her and absented himself from her habitation which he forced
her to obtain by destroying for her the common abode. If wilful and
malicious and persisted in for two years, it is desertion in the words
of the statute.
"(2) So, too, where a husband physically ejects his wife from
the common home.
"(3) So, also, where a husband threatens immediately to inflict
bodily harm on his wife unless she leaves, and she departs against her
will and because of justifiable fear of physical injury.
Legally, this becomes a matter of some complexity, and it can be grasped
more easily if the Reiter tests are compared to Freedman's breakdown of Pennsylvania law prior to 1946:85
Freedman's Analysis
1. Libellant, without an indepdendent cause of action, is turned out
of doors by respondent, persisted
in for two years. The turning out
may be actual, by physical ejection, or constructive, by locking
out. Such conduct had been recognized as "desertion" for some
time. 86
2. Libellant, with an independent
cause of action, is turnedout of
doors. Formerly, whether an action for desertion could be
brought was extremely doubtful
and the subject of conflict under the Young and Howe cases,
with the former ascendant.
3. Libellant, with an independent
cause of action, is not turned out
of doors by respondent. Under
the Young case, suit had to be
brought on the existing cause, not
in desertion.
4. Libellant has no independent
cause of action and is not turned
out of doors. No suit at all by
87
departing spouse.

Reiter Case Tests
1. Reiter case tests numbers one
and two incorporate the rule prior
to 1946.

2. Same as "1" above, and an action for desertion can be maintained.

3. Under Reiter test number three,
if the independent cause is cruel
and barbarous treatment (or
something akin to it: see discussion, infra), libellant could now
sue for desertion.
4. Under Reiter test number three,
no cause of action, but under
later cases suit might be permitted. Again, see discussion,
infra.

85 1 FREEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 27, § 243.
86 McDermott v. McDermott, 113 Pa. Super. 255, 173 At. 746 (1934).
87 Note the strict rule of the Pennsylvania cases that a party could withdraw from the marital
home with "reasonable cause" only when he had actual grounds for divorce. Van Dyke v. Van
Dyke, 135 Pa. 459, 19 Ad. 1061 (1890); Bunting v. Bunting, 156 Pa. Super. 244, 40 A. 2d
135 (1944).
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Obviously, the third part of the Reiter dictum is of critical importance,
and a prognosis of the case must depend upon what the courts have construed
the term "bodily harm" to mean. Even if it is interpreted as physical violence
or the apprehension thereof to the same degree required to sustain an action
for cruel and barbarous treatment, the Reiter decision clearly has enlarged the
scope of desertion by its rejection of the Young case rule that the libellant must
sue on the independent cause (classification number three, supra). If justifiable fear of bodily harm is construed to mean something less than the degree
of fear required for cruel and barbarous treatment, then the Reiter case has expanded the law of desertion in classification number four as well, and thus
considerably broadened the range of activity by a respondent which will confer
a cause in desertion upon the other spouse.
Recent cases in the wake of the Reiter decision do not offer any conclusive
test for determining the importance of this factor. In Heimovitz v. Heimovitz88
there was some evidence of locking out, although the court emphasized the
wife's chasing her husband down the stairs and throwing a bag containing his
clothes after him. Interestingly enough, the Superior Court affirmed a decree of
divorce for the libellant on the grounds of desertion because the facts were said
to be within the first and second classification of Reiter-even though the
chasing incident could hardly be characterized as putting out the husband wilfully and maliciously by force or fear of immediate bodily harm. In fact, the
case would seem to come far closer to the express prohibition of the Reiter decision: that a spouse who is merely "compelled" to leave cannot sue for desertion. Nor does it appear under the Heimovitz holding that the injured spouse
would have to show mistreatment of a kind that would rise even to the level
required for indignities.
In Scanga v. Scanga89 there was plenty of evidence of what might be termed incompatability, and a telephone threat by the wife, but it was not shown
that the husband was in fear of bodily harm. In this case, however, the Superior
Court reversed a decree of divorce because the husband's testimony in regard
to fear of his wife was at best tenuous and unconvincing. Thus, it seemed to
revert to the degree of fear needed for cruel and barbarous treatment.
It is impossible to project the results of' the constructive desertion cases
on the screen of future litigation without some reference to the sociological needs
they seek to fulfil. Reference already has been made to the need for a doctrine which, by enlarging the scope of the divorce statute and the Ingersoll
case, will accord the wife a remedy where she leaves the marital abode after
some abuse by the husband. In the preceding cases, the fact that the husband

88 161 Pa. Super. 522, 55 A. 2d 575 (1947), 52 DICK. L. REv. 129 (1948).
89 167 Pa. Super. 133, 74 A. 2d 723 (1950).
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is the libellant is rather an anomaly, since the classifications of40the Reiter case
by their very terms are directed to the departing wife situation.
The factors which have brought about this realistic expansion of the law
of desertion (if not its nomenclature) are mainly economic and social. The increased economic independence of the wife was pointed out earlier. What are
its social implications? If, for example, the application of constructive desertion
should result in an increase in the rate of divorce, does it mean that there will
have been a decline in the standards of domestic morality? One sociologist
states that more divorces may mean the opposite of moral decadence, especially
when they are obtained by the wife.
"It is doubtless true that moral values have shifted, but this does
not necessarily argue their decline. On the contrary, it is quite possible to contend that there has been a definite moral advance. This
is not to deny the fact that many divorces are the result of moral
degeneracy-that is conceded freely. But it also may be true that the
more exacting ethical demands in matrimony may render intolerable
conditions which formerly were condoned, and that many divorces are
to be accounted for as the result...
". .. It has been pointed out that a high divorce rate has a defwith the high ethical marriage standards of Amerinite correspondence
41
ican women."
Although it is not commonly made articulate, this viewpoint must be shared
by a considerable segment of the marrying public-a segment, moreover, which
is capable of making its weight felt in various mechanisms of society, including
the legal process. It may be true, as some reformers state, that the influence
of this social pressure at the trial or mastership level results only in administrative havoc and an increase in "consentable divorce" by perjured testimony.
The degree to which this is true certainly has not been established. For the
moment, it is enough to suggest that these same forces when applied at the
appellate level produce an expansion of formal rules which deals realistically
with societal needs.
Applied to the constructive desertion cases, it may well mean that when
a Reiter or Scanga case arises in the future (that is, with no locking out or physical ejection), but with a departing wife as libellant, that the element of "fear
of immediate bodily harm" will be accorded even less weight in the application of the third Reiter test.
In effect, the law of Pennsylvania will then have run full circle, with the
innocent and injured spouse departing the cohabitation for reasons which do
not amount to an independent cause of action, and with no turning out. A reThis is also true in the Heimovitz case, in which the court, after reviewing the Reiter docHeimtrine, said: "Of course, the same principles apply where the wife is the aggressor.
ovitz v. Heimovitz, 161 Pa. Super. 522, 526, 55 A. 2d 575, 576 (1947).
41 LICHTENBERGER, DIVORCE: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1931), reproduced in HARPER, PROPLEMS OF THE FAMILY 653 (1952).
40
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siduum of the statute would remain in the requirement that the "desertion" of
the respondent continue for a full two years without an effective reconciliation.
One of the most important developments in the expansion of grounds for
divorce by appellate interpretation of the statute has been in the cause of adultery, or, more precisely, in the metamorphosis of adulterous conduct as grounds
for adultery under the statute to the ground of indignities. 42 The appellate
courts have followed a torturous route in arriving at the present state of the
law, and their destination is by no means clearly defined.
The Pennsylvania Divorce Act provides that the innocent and injured
spouse may obtain a divorce "whenever it shall be judged . . . that the other
spouse: . . . (c) shall have committed adultery. . ."4 What constitutes adultery has always been a matter for judicial decision.
The prospective libellant contemplating an action for adultery is faced with
several problems, not all of them legal. He is expected to sustain a relatively
heavy burden of proof in comparison with an action for divorce in indignities,
and over the years obstacles have arisen which complicate the development of
such proof. 44 Moreover, the libellant as a rule knows that on the day his com-

plaint is filed an item will appear in the local newspaper, under the heading
"Divorce Actions," naming himself as plaintiff, his wife as defendant, the
grounds of the action, and the name of his attorney. The public reaction to
such an announcement alone is an inducement for bringing the action on other
grounds, if possible, aside from the extensive-and sometimes expensive-legal burdens alluded to earlier. Confronted with the public reluctance to be a
party to an action of adultery, it is easy to understand why attorneys are not
anxious to become known as counsel whose clients usually sue their mates for
adultery.
42 The Pennsylvania Divorce Act divides the traditional ground of cruelty into "cruel and barbarous treatment" and "indignities," each of which is a separate ground. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, §§ 10 (1) (e) and (f) (Purdon 1955). Cruelty exists only where the life of the innocent
spouse is endangered or seriously threatened, while indignities, in a very general sense, parallels
"mental cruelty" in other jurisdictons. It is defined in the act as conduct by a respondent which
renders the libellant's "condition intolerable and life burdensome." This is the basis for the
vaguest kind of judicial definition: "vulgarity, unmerited reproach, habitual contumely, studied
neglect, intentional incivility," and other similar offenses constitute the judicial formula. Breene
v. Breene, 76 Pa. Super. 568 (1921). For a thumbnail sketch of the caseholdings, see Note, lot
U. PA. L. REv. 1204, 1214, 1218 (1953).
43 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1) (c) (Purdon 1955).
44 Randolph v. Randolph, 59 Pa. Super. 377 (1915), confessions of the respondent or corespondent, without corroboration, are admissible but will not support a decree on the ground
of adultery. Connor v. Connor, 168 Pa. Super. 339, 77 A. 2d 697 (1951), proof of inclination
and opportunity which will sustain the action is difficult to establish. Comm. v. Attarian, 129
Pa. Super. 31, 194 At. 776 (1937), evidence of hired detectives may be looked upon with suspicion. Testimony as to non-access is complicated by the rule prohibiting disclosure of confidential communications over the objection of the other spouse, or where the legitimacy of a
child is involved. As to the latter, there is no appellate authority, and the lower courts are
in conflict. Peters v. Peters, 4 Pa. D. & C. (Beaver] 287 (1924); Thompson v. Thompson, 28
Daugh. [Pa.] 73 (1925).
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Have the pressures of public and professional opinion combined to influence appellate decisions on this level? It would seem that they have, for
the cases based on desertion and indignities together constitute most of the divorce actions brought in Pennsylvania, yet, according to reliable sociological
data, the incidence of adultery actually committed appears to be rising. 45 The
course of appellate decisions in the "adultery-indignities" area has altered considerably over the past fifty years, the most far reaching innovations having occurred since the last war.
The leading case representative of the early Pennsylvania view is Hexamer v. Hexamer,46 decided in 1910, with what might be described as an essentially Victorian outlook on marriage and its problems. The decision probably remains unmatched for a defendant's sheer virtuosity of infidelity, and it
abounds with facts which would indicate, even to the most insensitive husband, that
his wife was indulging freely in extra-marital relations. 4 7 Finally, after fifteen
or sixteen years of this kind of activity, the husband sued for divorce, alleging
cruel and barbarous treatment, and indignities. 48 The Pennsylvania Superior Court
held:
"The case is presented of a woman possessed of a frivolous disposition with a penchant for flirting, who fails to realize the dignity
and becoming decorum demanded of a matron occupying the social
position in which her husband had placed her; and who, by her levhas occasioned him chagrin, mortification, and sorrow . . . [I] n
this case, it is plain by reference to the authorities, no matter how
much the court may sympathize with libellant in his unhappy domestic relationship, that the acts complained of while proof of conduct
unbecoming a wife do not support the charge of cruel and barbarous
treatment or indignities to the person. 49
Clearly, in order to obtain a divorce for adultery under the Hexamer rule,
one had to allege adultery, or, in the converse, a divorce would not be granted on grounds other than those alleged in the libel.

oty,

45 "Hamilton

(1929) found 28 of his hundred men with records of extra-marital intercourse.
His figures would have been higher if he had dealt with older men." KINSEY, POMEROY,
After discussing the problem
MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 585 (1949).
of "cover-up" in his own study, Kinsey concluded: ". . .[I]t is probably safe to suggest that
about half of all the married males have intercourse with women other than their wives at
some time while they are married."
46 42 Pa. Super. 226 (1910).
47 E.g., ". . . [On a trip abroad,

the parties] went through Syria. During the journey respondent fell violently in love with a dragoman, and was with him from morning until night,
riding well in front of the party. When ascending Mount Tabor libellant was detained by a
monk pointing out historical places on the plain below. Respondent and the dragoman had gone
ahead, but on arrival at the meeting place, they were not there. Libellant waited an hour, and
fearful that they had been attacked by hyenas sent servants to search for them. They were unsuccessful. Later respondent appeared, with the dragoman leading the horses, 'radiant, her hair
in disorder.' " Id.at 228.
48 Under the Act of June 25, 1895, P.L. 308. The substantive provisions of this statute parallel the present act.
49 Supra note 46, at 235.
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How would this rule apply in a somewhat different context? Suppose a
husband sued his wife for divorce on the grounds of indignities, and by way
of defense she showed that his attentions to another woman were responsible
for her own acts of retaliation? Or, would the Hexamer rule exclude evidence
of adultery by the husband if the wife offered it as a defense to his suit in desertion? The former situation arose in Manzi v. Manzi,50 decided in the early
1930's, and the latter in Klaus v. Klaus,51 decided in 1942. The judicial attitude which pervades the Klaus decision is also representative of the treatment
accorded the husband in the earlier Manzi case.
After finding that her evidence would not sustain adultery, the court decided that libellant's deception of his wife as to his actual whereabouts should
be considered in determining his credibility. Then deliberately "Passing the question whether his conduct amounts to such indignities as would entitle the respondent to a divorce.

.

." the Superior Court went on to decide that there

was a consentable separation following the argument over the other woman.52
Therefore, no divorce was allowed the husband on the grounds of the wife's

desertion. Neither one of the cases clearly states that a continued association
with a person of the opposite sex by one spouse is an indignity to the other,
but the consideration of the testimony as a test of the libellant's credibility was
a crack in the Hexamer doctrine.
A new rule, however, was not long in coming. In Lowe v. Lowe58 the
husband had been carrying on an affair with another woman, and after some
arguments which arose out of his suspicion that his wife suspected him, he
severely beat her. The husband was forcibly removed from his home by the
police and did not return. Later, he sued his wife for divorce on the grounds
of "constructive" desertion. In overruling a decree for the husband, the Superior Court said: 54 "Conduct by a husband with respect to other women, although not sufficient to support a charge of adultery, may be considered as a
form of personal indignity to his wife. . ." Thus, the court made an explicit
rule of what had been treated obliquely in prior cases.
But the court had not exactly forgotten the Hexamer case. In Macormac
v. Macormac,55 where the evidence of the wife's misconduct with another man
was convincing, although not nearly so strong as the Hexamer facts, the Superior Court quoted that part of the Hexamer decision in which the Superior Court
sympathized with the husband's position but had nevertheless gone on to find
that even though ". . . [t]he pangs of jealousy may have rendered the con50 112 Pa. Super. 332; 171 At. 92 (1934).
51 147 Pa. Super. 189, 24 A. 2d 33 (1942).

52 ld. at 191, 24 A. 2d at 34.
53 148 Pa. Super. 439, 25 A. 2d 781 (1942).
54 Id. at 442, 25 A. 2d at 783. The last phrase used by the court is in the exact language of

the indignities section of the act. Here it was treated squarely as a matter of "constructive
desertion," although the same court denied in later cases that this doctrine applies in Pennsylvania.
f5 159 Pa. Super. 378, 48 A, 2d 136 (1946).
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dition of the husband intolerable and his life burdensome" 56 (that is, her conduct was an indignity to the husband), his remedy was a cause in adultery
under the act. The Hexamer doctrine obviously applied to the Macormac facts.
How did the court overcome it? Here, it said, there is more than wifely indiscretion and husbandly pangs of jealousy, but a real case of infidelity! And
on this distinction, the Superior Court reversed the lower court, which had
denied the husband a divorce for indignities.
In his work, Dr. Kinsey made the interesting observation that the varying environmental circumstances of judges often lead to widely disparate treatment of cases, especially those involving criminal sex offenses.51 The stafidards of the different strata of a community also vary from time to time, and
Kinsey's comment would seem to be borne out by the quite different emphasis
which the court in the fairly recent case of Blansett v. BlansetI58 placed on
the wife's misconduct. How does the following statement, in which the judge's
own feelings clearly intrude in the decision, compare with the mild reproof
of the Hexamer case?
"Respondent's course of conduct was humiliating, degrading, and
so notorious as to make her husband the laughing stock of his fellow
employees. That is the one thing a normal individual cannot stand for,
no matter what indignities he may be required to endure before the
stage is reached 'beyond which human indulgence cannot be expected
to submit.

. .'

59

After it became established that a spouse's conduct with someone other
than his marital partner was an indignity, it was only a matter of time until
an issue which had been carefully ignored would come to the appellate courts:
could proof of actual adultery support a case brought on the grounds of indignities?
A tailor-made fact situation was presented to the Superior Court in Allen
v. Allen, 60 decided a year after the Blansett case. There was other evidence,
which, if added to the act of adultery charged by the libellant, might have
56 42 Pa. Super. 226, 240 (1910).
57 KINSEY, op. cit. supra note 45, at 390. "On sex cases, the decisions of the judge on the

bench are often affected by the mores of the group from which he originated. Judges often
come from better educated groups, and their severe condemnation of sex offenders is largely a
defense of the code of their own social level. . . The influence of the mores is strikingly shown
by a study of the decisions which are reached by judges with different social backgrounds.
There is still a portion of the legal profession that has not gone to college and, particularly
where judges are elected by popular vote, there are some instances of judges who have originated in the lower social levels. . . The significance of the background becomes most apparent when two judges, one of upper level and one of lower level, sit in alternation on the same
bench. The record of the upper level judge may involve convictions and maximum sentences
in a high proportion of sex cases, particularly those that involve non-marital intercourse or
prostitution. The judge with the lower level background may convict in only a small fraction
of the cases."
58 162 Pa. Super. 45, 56 A. 2d 136 (1946).
59 Id. at 48, 56 A. 2d at 342.
60 165 Pa. Super. 379, 67 A. 2d 629 (1949).
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amounted to indignities, but it alone would not sustain the action. Thus, the
critical question was presented. The Superior Court held that "Adultery in
fact is an indignity in its gravest form. But the legislature wisely has seen fit
to make adultery a separate and distinct cause of divorce and has prescribed
a procedure appropriate to the seriousness of the charge." 6' Among other things,
the procedure to which the court referred requires that the named co-respondent in an action of adultery be notified of the charge and given an opportunity to be heard 62 (although he is not a party to the action), and if the charge
of adultery is sustained, Pennsylvania imposes a personal incapacity on the respondent and the paramour which prohibits them from marrying. Naturally,
none of this applies in an indignities action.
In the Allen case, the Superior Court seemed to restore the strict doctrine
of the Hexamer case. Some months later, however, in January, 1950, Phipps
v. Phipps6 3 reached the Superior Court. In this case, the respondent-wife had
carried on an affair with the parties' chauffeur-butler, and the husband sued for
divorce on the grounds of indignities. The facts were more conclusive than
those of the Allen case, since there was testimony developed through several
disinterested witnesses to the extent of the affair, in the numbers of times the
wife and the chauffeur were seen together in compromising circumstances, and
in the extended duration of the illicit relation. In affirming a decree for the
husband, the Superior Court considered all the evidence together and overcame
respondent's objection to the admission of the adultery incident by finding
that the case was within the Blansett decision.
An appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania followed,6 4 predicated
on the Superior Court's own rule in the Allen case and also on the basis that
an indignity could not result from an act about which the libellant was completely unaware at the time suit was commenced. The Supreme Court, in a
five to two decision, affirmed the Superior Court and thereby established the
rule that evidence of adultery is admissible in an action for indignities. In so
doing, it overruled the Allen case, extending a caveat, however, in this manner: "How far such evidence goes in helping to establish a course of conduct,
requisite to sustaining a charge of indignities is for the fact-finder to appraise,
subject, of course, to appellate review for legal sufficiency of the evidence." 6 5
It is suggested that the Phipps case has, in effect, erased adultery as a
separate cause of action for divorce in Pennsylvania, because the libellant can
almost always allege other incidents of a more trivial character to show the respondent's "course of conduct" if family disintegration has reached the point
where one of the spouses commits an act of adultery which becomes known to
61 Id. at 380, 67 A. 2d at 630.
62 PA. R. Civ. P.

1136.

68 165 Pa. Super. 622, 70 A. 2d 415 (1950).
64 368 Pa. 291, 81 A. 2d 523, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 465 (1951).
65 Id. at 295, 81 A. 2d at 524.
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the other. That is to say, a single act of adultery committed, ordinarily, in extreme privacy is not likely to come to the attention of the other spouse, and it
66
would appear that many extra-marital contacts are sporadic, single contacts.
Thus, the Phipps case, if confined to its terms, would not seem to allow room
for an expansion or perversion of its doctrine by permitting an action in indignities where there is a complete absence of other reprehensible conduct. Of
course, the problem may well be in imposing the restriction.
What is the social significance of this line of cases? For one thing, adultery, committed often and openly enough to come to the attention of the injured
spouse, is an affront too great to ignore, and too frequent, apparently, not to
become part of many divorce actions; but the statutory remedy for adultery, with
the measure of proof demanded by its interpretive cases, was too cumbersome,
too expensive, and too embarrassing. The remedy had lost its "social utility,"
in the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo. If public demand and sentiment, articulate
or otherwise, was not responsible for this line of cases, it is difficult to see what
legal need was served by the expansion of indignities as the applicable remedy.
The contradictions in the Allen, Blansett and Phipps cases, it is submitted, result when the court is confronted with an established rule of law which, it
senses, cannot survive in a changing society.
A less well-defined but equally relevant change of appellate viewpoint is
reflected in the cases dealing with the refusal of a spouse to engage in sexual
intercourse. The original Pennsylvania doctrine is represented in the sternly phrased
decision of Eshbach v. Eshbach,6 7 in which the Supreme Court adopted the rule
of the English ecclesiastical courts that refusal of intercourse is not cruelty and
does not in any manner constitute a cause of action.
Over the years the rule became case-hardened, reaching its apotheosis in
1941, when the Superior Court reversed a lower court decree of divorce in
Rausch v. Rausch.68 The respondent claimed, after a difficult twin birth which
temporarily affected her mentally-but not physically, that her husband's insistence on intercourse was injuring her health. Fearing pregnancy, she had
withdrawn to another bedroom. Other than the grievance complained of, there
was no evidence of misconduct by the husband. Nonetheless, the court practically
reversed the roles of the parties to the action, saying of him: "Libellant was irritable, domineering and quarrelsome before, but he became more so after he
was made to occupy a separate bedroom. He complained that respondent treated him as though she despised him and that she had inspired the same attitude
69
toward him in their children."
What other condusion the husband might reasonably be expected to have
drawn from his wife's prolonged conduct is not mentioned by the Superior
66 KinsEY, op. cit.
Supra note 45.
67 23 Pa. 343 (1854).
68 146 Pa. Super. 342, 22 A. 2d 221
69 Id. at 344, 22 A. 2d at 222.

(1941).
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Court. Indeed, one would conclude from the discussion of the case that as late
as the year 1941 the court felt that intercourse was not an integral part of marriage--or, at least, that in its absence no decent spouse would be heard to complain. In view of what is known of sexual behavior and its acknowledged impact on other conduct, the husband's actions seem something less than reprehensible. 70 Perhaps the most disturbing feature of the Rausch decision was the
court's reliance on children's rather insubstantial testimony.7 1
The doctrine that refusal of intercourse was not an element in any cause
in divorce persisted in this stringent form until the case of Bobst v. Bobst7 2 came
to the Pennsylvania appellate courts. The husband, a minister, had sued his wife
for divorce on the grounds of indignities, and at the trial of the case he attempted to establish various acts of misconduct on her part. Most of them were
a kind of professional disparagement, ranging from accusations of his illicit
activity with some of the female parishoners to thumbing her nose at him while
he was leading prayer meetings. The husband also alleged another kind of misconduct-or wifely nonfeasance, at least-which is outlined in the Superior Court
decision reversing the decree which the trial court had awarded the husband.
The rococo language of the decision is all too reminiscent of the old Hexamer
case.
". .. They lived together until 1944; yet if libellant's unchivalrous
exposure of the whispered intimacies of the connubial chamber were
authentic, the marriage was wrecked in the first six months. This he
called 'the seat' of the trouble between them. It has never dawned upon
him that at that very moment she was bearing within her evidence
which, fructifying by the birth of a daughter six months later, irrefra ably refuted his apocryphal revelation. His disclosure is spurious,
and even were8 it true, sexual mismating is not an indignity nor a ground
7
for divorce."
On appeal the Supreme Court, which approached the situation somewhat
more calmly, reversed the Superior Court and reinstated the trial court's decree
of divorce.74 Referring to the immediate question, it said: ". . . The record
contains evidence to which the Superior Court refers by the term 'sexual mismating.' The fact, if shown, may be an event in the series of indignities charged
. . . to be considered with the other evidence.

-.

This was a radical departure from the Eshbach and Rausch cases, although
what constitutes "sexual mismating" is anyone's guess. There is another important aspect of the decision: under the Supreme Court's treatment, evidence
of sexual mismating appears to be admissible even though a child has been
born of the marriage, thus negating the traditional notion that the production
70 KINSaY,

op. cit. supra note 45, at 253.

71 146 Pa. Super. at 345, 22 A. 2d at 222.
72 160 Pa. Super. 340, 51 A. 2d 414 (1947).

78 Id. at 344, 51 A. 2d at 416.

74 357 Pa. 441, 54 A. 2d 898 (1947).
75 Id. at 454, 54 A. 2d 904.
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of issue shows sexual compatability. How far the Bobst doctrine will be carried is difficult to estimate, but it demonstrates appellate cognition of the now
generally recognized and mentionable fact that satisfactory sexual relations are
a vital part of marriage.
What other inferences can be drawn from the Bobst case? If sexual mismating is to be considered an element of indignities in the future, a basis would
seem to be established for argument that deliberate refusal to have intercourse
by a spouse with physical capacity should also be an indignity. In Pennsylvania,
such refusal has never been available as grounds for indignities 76 or desertion.77
IV

Conclusion
To begin with, the mere coincidence in time of the Reiter, Phipps, and
Bobst cases 78 may well be regarded as some indication of the motivation of the
courts in expanding the grounds for divorce as they were developed in the
older cases. It may also provide a clue as to where the decisions will lead. The
writer suggests that their chronological correspondence is a direct reflection of
new attitudes which crystallized during the second world war, and, within the
present statutory framework, it is probable that the enlargement of existing grounds
for divorce by judicial decision will continue to be an important factor in Pennsylvania divorce law.
Why has the realistic approach of the appellate courts inadvertently con..
tributed to the hypocrisy of some members of the bar-and, indirectly, been responsible for criticism in the public mind for the operation of legal process in
domestic relations cases?
When the rule of the Blansett case 79 was in effect, for example, how could
a lawyer seriously advise his client to testify to acts showing the respondent's
"misconduct" with a person of the opposite sex but not allude to actual adultery-that is, without inducing some degree of cynicism in the lawyer himself?
This distinction proved almost too fine for the profession, and, eventually, in
the Phipps case resulted in an appeal to the Supreme Court. Even under the
more liberal rule of the latter case, however, what temptations must confront
the attorney interviewing a prospective client who can establish a single act
of adultery but lacks credible evidence of a "course of conduct"? Is he to advise the injured spouse to sue in adultery, with its attendant problems, legal and
social, and thus run the risk of losing him? Or should he perhaps urge the
client to "remember" other grievances from the multiplicity of trivia upon which
76 Supra note 67.
77 Cunningham v. Cunningham,

60 Pa. Super. 622 (1915). The reason assigned for not al.
lowing a cause in desertion is that refusal to have intercourse is not a ground for divorce, and
therefore it is not such "reasonable cause- as to permit one spouse to leave the other.
78 Enlarging the grounds of desertion, adultery as an indignity, and refusal of intercourse as
an element of indignities, respectively.
79 That a spouse's open misconduct with a person of the opposite sex could be considered an
indignity.
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indignities is usually based? The statistics of actions predicated on indignities
compared to those based on adultery answer the question.8 0 More important,
what kind of an impression of our divorce law must remain with an angry and
cuckolded spouse if the attorney selects the obvious course, even though it momentarily solves the client's (and his attorney's) problem? In the face of these
value conflicts, it is no answer to say that an honest lawyer would not act in
this manner, or that he should not handle divorce problems if he wants to remain honest.
All these problems are compounded when the divorce action finally arrives
in the master's office. The gap which exists between the offense alleged and the
matter really sought to be proved places the master in a doubly uncomfortable
position: he must decide questions of fact which, even if proved, he knows are
only peripherally related to the actual gravamen of the action, and once coming to a decision, he must write an opinion applying decisional law to those
facts-although the law of "indignities" which he may apply bears totally on
the question of adultery. It is no wonder that many scrupulous lawyers are repulsed by the thought of involvement with domestic relations cases, or that the
average lawyer approaches his duties as attorney or master with cynicism.
What is the solution to the troublesome problem of divorce and family instability? Constructive legislation would appear to be the indispensable element
of any cure. Such legislation necessarily would embrace a revision of the trial
or mastership system and would include the more notable features of the family court program-social and psychiatric aid, and possibly some means of enforced reconciliation over a limited period. A statute taking advantage of these
agencies would fill a vacuum which now exists on the level of divorce administration and doubtless tend to reduce the number of actions brought. It would
also relieve the lawyer from the criticism of not doing a job which he is not
equipped to do.
How would the appellate courts function under new legislation? Obviously, no statute can provide remedies for the myriad facets of matrimonial misbehavior which are litigated daily, and one seeking to limit the role of appellate
interpretation is out of the question. We need a general definition of marital
offenses which recognizes that appellate decisions greatly influence divorce proceedings at the trial level. Most important of all, a new statute should per80 Clague, Statistics of Family Instability, RECORD OF THE CONFERENCE ON
AND THE UNSTABLE

LAW, MEDICINE

FAMILY, NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE AND THE NEW YORK COUN-

LAWYERS ASSOCIATION (1949). Nationally, in 1931, cruelty (which would include both
cruel and barbarous treatment and indignities in Pennsylvania) accounted for 42.4% of all
divorces, desertion 27.9%, adultery 7.5%, combination of causes 8.0%, and others 14.2%.
Cf. KEPHART, A STUDY OF DIVORCE: PHILADELPHIA COUNTY (unpublished thesis in the University of Pennsylvania Library, 1951), as cited in Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1204, 1206 (1953):
random Philadelphia sampling disclosed that between 1937 and 1950, 46.9% of the divorces
were based on desertion, 29.7% on indignities, and 16.8% on both indignities and cruel and
barbarous treatment, with other grounds accounting for only 7.1%.
TY
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mit the appellate courts to continue the useful process of arranging domestic
relations law to fit social need without the effect of creating the gap between
the cause as alleged in the complaint and the actual grounds which are relied
upon at the trial or hearing. Even though social utility may be served by permitting an action in desertion as a remedy for cruelty-or in indignities for adultery (and other offenses)-it is this phase of present divorce law and not the
effectf of that law which has aroused most of the public and professional cynicism.
New legislation could solve the problem without drastically remaking our
present substantive rules of divorce, by simply broadening the area in which the
rules would apply. This would mean, for instance, that a complaint in indignities would not rule out all proof of adultery. Statutory recognition of "constructive" desertion could also unravel the knotty problem which now exists in the
desertion cases.
In any event, it is important to keep in mind that the family court system,
of itself, will not solve the last problem alluded to, and, until the statutory
nomenclature of remedies in divorce catches up with the substantive law handed down by the appellate courts, the charges of cynicism and hypocrisy will
continue.

